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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the motives of emerging global powers in 
decision-making processes concerned with humanitarian crises, and whether the 
principle of “Responsibility to Protect” has influenced the decisions of GIBSA in UN-
resolutions concerned with the Syrian Crisis. GIBSA is an unofficial group comprised 
of Germany, India, Brazil and South Africa, who were part of the UNSC during 2011-
2012 (Brazil 2010-2011), and strive to gain UNSC permanent membership. The data 
assembled from first hand sources, such as UN-archives, describes the motivations 
and votes offered during UNSC and GA resolutions concerned with Syria in 2011-
2012. The motives were assumed to build upon the three logics of human action: logic 
of consequence, characterized by national aspirations, logic of appropriateness 
described as role-playing and logic of arguing, accounting for norm-suasion. By 
categorizing the motivations and votes within these three logics, the conclusion 
suggested that although the actors account for all logics prior to their decisions, their 
arguments are mainly influenced by norm-suasion and national aspirations, as they 
argue for the fulfillment of R2P pillars, yet not exclusively for the sake of 
humanitarian reasons, rather to ensure the support needed for an eventual permanent 
membership at the UNSC. IBSA also focus on strategic arguing for sovereignty, 
which correspondingly is in their interests. Role-playing is mainly accounted for by 
Germany due to its closer affiliation to its allies, but only if peaceful measures are 
introduced. Hence R2P is accounted for by emerging global powers, but not 
necessarily for the right purpose. 
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Abbreviations 
AU = African Union 
EU = European Union 
FSA = Free Syrian Army 
GIBSA = Germany, India, Brazil and South Africa 
GISA = Germany, India and South Africa 
IBSA = India, Brazil and South Africa 
ICISS = International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
IR = International Relations 
LAS = League of Arab States 
MENA = Middle East and North Africa 
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NTC = National Transitional Council in Libya 
P3 = UNSC permanent members, France, USA and UK 
P5 = UNSC permanent members, P3, Russia and China 
RC = Russia and China 
R2P = Responsibility to Protect 
SA = South Africa 
SNC = Syrian National Council 
UAE = United Arab Emirates 
UK = United Kingdom 
UNGA = United Nations General Assembly 
UNSC = United Nations Security Council 
UNSG = United Nations Secretary-General 
UNSMIS = United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria 
US = United States of America 
WWII = World War Two 
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Introduction 
In the wake of the Arab public uprisings, the principle of “Responsibility to Protect” 
(R2P) was revived at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to deter human 
rights violations through humanitarian, economic, diplomatic or even military 
interventions, if national governments are unable/unwilling to protect their citizens 
(Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 825). R2P was adopted at the World Summit in 2005, 
and embraced as a new tool by the international community to hinder any future 
Srebrenica or Rwanda, as a protection against mass atrocities committed on citizens 
(Offiong, 2013: 2f). The first R2P intervention, Resolution 1973, legitimized 
intervention in Libya yet its implementation was criticized widely leading to an on-
going discussion regarding its relevance, especially in complicated cases as in Syria 
(Evans, 2013 & Bellamy et al., 2011).  
Today, approximately 130 000 people have died in Syria (Hansson, 2014), renowned 
as a civil war due to increased division between ideological and ethnic factions, where 
the government is unable to protect its citizens from further atrocities, and also played 
a role in the killings (Skansholm, 2013: 1), which actualizes R2P intervention. Syria’s 
strong allies in the UNSC, Russia and China (RC), vetoed against such measures; 
which is predictable since they share strategic and economic interests in Syria; while 
US, UK and France (P3) push for drastic measures (Skansholm, 2013 & Garcia, 
2013). Yet in an increasingly multipolar world, after decades of bipolarism (Cold 
War) and unipolarism (after the downfall of the Soviet Union), the role of emerging 
global powers is gradually progressing, especially in shaping general opinion and 
maintaining international norms, such as R2P (Brosig, 2012: 4f). Emerging global 
powers such as the unofficial GIBSA group, comprised of Germany, India, Brazil and 
South Africa, were part of the UNSC during the uprising of the Syrian Crisis and 
played a role in the negotiations of resolutions aiming at solving the conflict. Hence 
the purpose of this paper is to analyze the potential influence of R2P on their 
decision-making process in resolutions concerned with Syria to ensure if the principle 
is still relevant. The group has arisen from mutual interests in becoming permanent 
UNSC members, and to share common norms and values, in order to challenge the 
international system’s hegemony. GIBSA are leading democracies who support 
multilateral agreements and averse from aggression if possible, yet encourage UN 
peace missions in areas where the use of force is inevitable (Brosig, 2012: 3ff). Brosig 
(2012) describes GIBSA as supporters of R2P and important actors in its development 
and norm-construction process. Their perspectives in general are assumed to reflect 
the global opinion, where there is a clear support for R2P norms, yet unclear support 
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regarding its implementation (Evans, 2013). Post-conflict states are also assumed to 
respect the positioning of the GIBSA countries, which are more or less newly 
established democracies that underwent decades of internal conflicts for different 
reasons. In other words, Syria is likelier to share similarities in its conflict with India, 
who also had its fair share of ethnic and religious divisions and is a relatively newly 
established democracy, than with the US or France who have enjoyed democracy for 
centuries (Higashi, 2012).  
Since GIBSA lack the power position and vetoes enjoyed by the five permanent 
members at the UNSC with vetoing rights (P5), and geopolitical interests in Syria, 
their perspectives are yet to be researched, hence the purpose of this paper. Although 
GIBSA’s votes are not necessarily free from any personal gains, as they are aspiring 
global powers and in need of international recognition, they are assumed more likely 
to vote in accordance with institutional regulations that have been supported by the 
majority of countries (Brosig, 2012: 4f). Their motives may change in accordance 
with the votes, situation and arguments presented during resolution proposals. Hence, 
acting exclusively on behalf of national interests for aspiring global powers may harm 
their ambitions to become permanent members eventually, which is also in their 
interests (Brosig, 2012: 3f). Therefore, analyzing the motives of GIBSA will help in 
understanding whether R2P influences the decision-making process of emerging 
global powers or if it is solely a tool utilized once suitable to national aspirations. In 
addition to the possibility of affirming the pillars of R2P and/or attaining national 
interests, emerging powers may vote in accordance with their assumed obligations, by 
supporting their allies and/or maintaining their loyalties towards a certain notion, such 
as sovereignty etc. To conclude, this paper uses motive analysis of GIBSA’s votes 
and arguments in resolutions concerned with Syria to extract the potential influences 
on their decisions, and comprehend whether international principles, such as R2P, are 
decisive in shaping the opinions of emerging global powers. Hence, if R2P is 
accounted for in their decision-making process, we can assume its relevance, but if 
not, the principle may be lost. 
This paper argues that although supporting ones allies is contemplated; especially for 
Germany since it relies more on the EU than GISA rely on their allies; taking into 
consideration R2P and argue for the fulfillment of its pillars is crucial to gain support 
by the majority of states. Thus we may conclude that international principles 
influence emerging global powers, but only if the outcome benefits its aspirations; 
hence R2P is alive, but not exclusively for humanitarian reasons. 
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Disposition 
This paper is organized in the following sequence: the first part covers the 
background of the situation in hand, with an understanding of R2P, its application in 
Libya and the positioning of GIBSA countries’ on R2P prior to the Syrian Crisis etc. 
The second part accounts for the literature review, while the third part discusses the 
theoretical framework this paper is built on, which are the three logics of human 
action: logic of consequences, logic of appropriateness and logic of arguing. The 
fourth part covers the methods and materials used to conduct this paper. The fifth part 
covers the empirical analysis of this paper, which correlates the theories available 
with the material used. The last part concludes this paper with additional reflections 
about the research’s contribution. 
Background 
This section will give a deeper insight into the Syrian Crisis, the principle of R2P, its 
application in Libya, the positioning of GIBSA on R2P prior to the Syrian Crisis, and 
the purpose of this paper.  
The Syrian Crisis 
Following the uprisings in many Middle Eastern and North African countries 
(MENA) in 2010 and 2011, known as the Arab Spring, protests spread to Syria in 
early 2011. The preliminary reasons for the protests are assumed related to the arrest 
of children painting revolutionary slogans (Zariouh, 2013: 65). However, the 
demonstration turned into a call from many thousands protestors demanding the 
resignation of the regime after the crackdown by security forces. The conflict 
escalated and turned soon into warfare between military forces and opposing rebel 
forces, united under the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The FSA encompassed different 
ideologies, religions and ethnic groupings, yet with common wish to ensure the 
resignation of the Syrian regime (Rodgers et. al, 2012).  
Historic Background to the Conflict 
Hafez al-Assad, the father of Bashar, was defense minister in 1966. In 1970, he 
overthrew the former Syrian president and imposed an authoritarian regime, with 
clear support from religious and ethnic minorities who felt threatened by the Sunni 
majority. Al-Assad was an Alawite, a sect within Shia-Islam, which have been 
historically fierce enemies with Sunnis. Al-Assad began his campaign by defeating 
rebellions in Sunni pre-dominated cities, such as Aleppo, Hama and Homs, which are 
also the main battlefields of today’s conflict, and also by appointing mainly Alawites 
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in the security and intelligence sectors to safeguard his presidency (Gifkins, 2012). 
After his death in 2000, Bashar al-Assad succeeded him and was considered a 
reformist at start. Yet after the crackdown on the protests in 2011, people lost faith in 
him and old ideological and sectarian grudges resurfaced (Rodgers et. al, 2012). 
The Syrian Civil War 
Following the crackdown on protestors by military forces in 2011, Syria became a 
battlefield between governmental forces and rebels. In mid 2011, a political 
opposition group, Syrian National Council (SNC), was founded and demanded the 
resignation of the Ba’ath regime and the establishment of a democratic government. 
Since these demands were not encountered, SNC formed the FSA, including deserted 
military forces and rebellious civilians, with clear goal to overthrow the Ba’ath 
regime (ICRtoP, 2012). The formation of a military branch implied a loss of faith in 
dialogues, which spread throughout the entire country. By the end of 2011, the Syrian 
government lost control over many cities and what did emerge as peaceful protests 
turned into a Civil War between and among ethnic, sectarian and ideological 
groupings. The conflict was no longer a case between governmental forces and FSA; 
instead many partitions reappeared. Many different minorities, such as the Alawites, 
Christians and Kurds, took to arms in order to protect their villages in case of 
repercussions for historical reasons by other minorities, or even the Sunni majority, 
and/or to establish autonomous regions (Gifkins, 2012: 375-385). 
Today, more than 130000 people lost their lives, 2.5 millions left the country and 
more than 5 millions are internally displaced, causing immense humanitarian crises in 
the country and among its neighbors (Hansson, 2014). Since the Syrian government is 
unable to stop mass atrocities, and committed much of it, and the humanitarian crisis 
is immense, R2P is eligible, not necessarily through military means, but most 
importantly through a reaction by the international community (HRC, 2012). 
Therefore, this paper is dedicated to understand the motives of emerging global 
powers, such as GIBSA, in resolution voting concerned with Syria, and whether R2P 
has influenced their decisions since it is highly actualized in this Crisis. 
Responsibility to Protect 
The principle of “Responsibility to Protect” was advocated by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 and recognized 
by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) at the 2005 UN World Summit. The 
acknowledgment signified a commitment by the international community to the 
norms and values of the principle (Bellamy, 2010: 158ff). The purpose of R2P is to 
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prevent mass atrocities and human rights violations from occurring again: such as 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, after the 
international arena stood by during the horrible events of Srebrenica and Rwanda 
(Offiong, 2013: 2f). The UNSC has advocated civilian protection ever since through 
various resolutions and memorandums that support international commitment to 
safeguard an endangered population, prosecute human rights violators and intervene if 
needed, diplomatically, economically and even militarily (Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 
827f). The principle of R2P was reaffirmed at the UNSC in Resolution 1674, in 2006, 
and Resolution 1894, in 2009 (UNSC, 2009), along with a newly established joint 
office, Global Centre for R2P, for the maintenance of the principle. 
R2P represents a conceptualization of the interaction between human rights and 
sovereignty, in which the latter is no longer recognized as absolute, as mandated in 
the Westphalian treaties. Instead, state sovereignty is recognized as a responsibility to 
maintain order and protection of the civilians, and if violated, the international 
community has the right to intervene under UNSC mandate. Thus, human rights are 
conceived more important than state sovereignty in R2P (Thakur, 2006: 251). 
The principle of R2P contains three founding pillars that should be respected prior to 
any R2P intervention (Badescu, 2010: 110): 
 The state has the sole responsibility to protect its citizens from mass atrocities 
committed from either internal or external enemies 
 The international community has the responsibility to offer assistance to a 
state which is unable to maintain its responsibilities towards its citizens 
 If the responsible state is unable, or unwilling, to respect its responsibilities, 
the international community has the responsibility to intervene through 
humanitarian and/or diplomatic measures, or in last resort, militarily 
R2P consists also of three distinct guidelines of implementation if mass atrocities are 
likely to occur, are occurring or have occurred, that differentiate it from humanitarian 
intervention. Although they share similar characteristics regarding non-sovereignty, 
they differ in that humanitarian intervention focuses mainly on the right for military 
interference, while R2P stresses the responsibility to intervene to protect citizens in 
danger, and military intervention is only used as last resort (Madsen & Selsbaek, 
2012: 10ff): 
 The responsibility to prevent: address root causes to an internal conflict 
through dialogue with the conflicting parties 
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 The responsibility to react: respond to human rights violations through 
appropriate means, such as diplomacy, sanctions and interventions 
 The responsibility to rebuild: provide assistance for recovery, diplomatic talks 
between the conflicting sides and reconstruction in the aftermath of the crisis 
This paper will focus on the second guideline, the responsibility to react, as it is the 
most relevant aspect of R2P in the case of the Syrian Crisis today. Since the Syrian 
Crisis is ongoing and a solution is yet to be found to hinder further mass atrocities, an 
analysis of the decision outcome made by the GIBSA countries can only be explained 
through the responsibility to react; whether the GIBSA countries are in support of 
diplomatic, humanitarian, economic and/or military intervention. Once again, it is 
crucial to pinpoint that military intervention is considered only as last resort in R2P, 
as identified in the ICISS report (2001), and also as a tool to protect civilians, and not 
to ensure regime change, as postulated during the Libyan intervention in Resolution 
1973, which will be discussed in the following section (Roberts, 2011).  
R2P in Libya - Resolution 1973 
This section will offer a summary of the events that occurred prior, during and after 
the first R2P intervention. Both scholars and countries, including GIBSA and RC, 
criticized R2P intensely, and even presumed its death, in the aftermath of Libya since 
they assumed that P3 and NATO misused the principle (Evans, 2013). Hence it is 
important to clarify the historical application of R2P, in order to understand whether 
the intervention in Libya had any influence on the decisions of GIBSA in Syria. 
Much like Syria, in the wake of the Arab Spring and the uprisings of civil societies in 
the MENA-region, Libyans took the streets, on 15
th
 of February 2011, demanding the 
resignation of the Libyan dictator Muammar Kaddafi. The protests quickly expanded 
to different cities and shortly the ”National Transitional Council” (NTC) was 
established as a replacement to the government once defeated. Kaddafi responded 
with brutal force and threats to “chase the cockroaches” and “cleanse Libya house by 
house”, forcing the international community and regional organizations to condemn 
such actions and rhetoric (Madsen & Selsbaek, 2012: 14ff). Many countries and 
organizations reacted instantaneously, as France recognized the NTC as the legitimate 
government and called for intervention against the regime to stop further atrocities 
against the people; followed by the UK and League of Arab States (LAS). The 
situation quickly escalated to a civil war, with governmental and pro-Kaddafi regimes 
controlling most territories, while the NTC held others in East Libya. The EU 
imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions, yet more was anticipated to protect the 
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people on the ground, hence the proposal of Resolution 1970 (ibid: 15-18). Resolution 
1970 was adopted by the UNSC on 26
th
 of February 2011, only two weeks after the 
initial protests, following the demands of the Libyan civil society, LAS, African 
Union (AU), and Human Rights Council etc. It proposed the imposition of arms 
embargo and travel ban of members of the regime, along with freezing their assets. 
This proved non-sufficient and hence resolution 1973 was suggested in March 17
th
, 
demanding an immediate cease-fire and ending of mass atrocities, along with an 
imposition of a no-flight zone over Libyan territory to obstruct further use of 
airstrikes against the population. The critical part in the resolution specified the use of 
“all necessary measures” to protect the civilian, yet with no foreign boots on Libyan 
soil. NATO led this operation, known as “Operation Unified Protector”, assisted by 
Sweden, Jordan, UAE and Qatar (ibid: 40-45). The blurriness of “all necessary 
measures” lead to increased criticism against the misuse of R2P in Libya as many 
countries, especially GIBSA, felt that NATO overused force by supporting the NTC 
with arms and also striking pro-Kaddafi forces who did not cause any threats against 
civilians at the moments of the strikes. Some criticized NATO for misusing R2P to 
guarantee regime change, which is not in line with the principle since it only 
emphasizes the protection of citizens, and not agenda setting or regime removal 
(Evans, 2013). Resolution 1973 threatened the survival of R2P, as clear guidelines 
were lacking on procedural once military intervention is imposed, and the risk of 
overarching the principle ones voted through (Madsen & Selsbaek, 2012: 46-52). 
GIBSA on R2P prior to Syria 
This subsection will offer background descriptions for each GIBSA “member” 
regarding their positioning on the principle of R2P and its application in Libya. 
The Federal Republic of Germany 
Germany has since the end of World War Two (WWII) emphasized the importance of 
multilateral agreements and international regulations, mainly through non-military 
resolutions. Germany’s first military participation since WWII came in the Kosovo 
War in 1999 due to NATO involvement, which Germany is a part of (Brozus, 2012: 
53). This triggered the role and responsibilities of this former European superpower, 
which was keen to regain influence. Germany welcomed R2P since it assumes that 
sovereignty is entitled to nations who respect their responsibilities towards citizens, 
and also since the UNSC has the sole authorization to interfere with others’ 
sovereignty. Germany was the first state to invite the newly appointed UN Secretary 
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General Special Adviser on R2P, Edward Luck, for an official consultation in 2008 
(Brozus, 2012: 54-58).  
In the case of R2P in Libya, Germany abstained from voting in Resolution 1973. This 
indicates that Germany refused to align itself with its natural allies, NATO, which it 
was criticized for. The decision was based on the likelihood of an increased loss of 
civilian lives, risk of spreading the war across the MENA-region and also due to 
possibility of military failure. Instead, Germany emphasized the importance in 
supporting democratic development through peaceful measures (Brozus, 2012: 60ff).  
The Republic of India 
India has since its colonial liberation from the UK maintained a good relation with the 
international community, through diplomatic and institutional cooperation. The Indian 
government criticized the proposal of R2P up until the 2005 World Summit, mainly 
due to its historical mistrust towards westernized norms, which it assumed was a 
disguise for pursuing national aspirations (Hall, 2013). India even attempted to disrupt 
the ratification of the principle during the World Summit in 2005, but eventually 
accepted its authorization, without losing its concerns (Bellamy, 2009). Although 
India accepted R2P in 2005, it kept its resistance, mainly towards the third pillar, 
which states that the international community has the responsibility to intervene in a 
sovereign state. India affirms the first and second pillar, that a state is responsible to 
protect its own populations and that the international community may offer assistance, 
yet the focus should be on capacity building and early warnings, instead of coercive 
measures included in the third pillar. India emphasizes the importance of sovereignty 
and non-intervention, unless military use is proposed as last resort and for genuine 
humanitarian reasons (Garwood-Gowers, 2013: 15). In the 2009 UNGA dialogue 
regarding R2P, the Indian ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri stated:  
“The responsibility to protect should in no way provide a pretext for 
humanitarian intervention or unilateral action.”(24 July 2009) 
India abstained in Resolution 1973, well aware of the Libyan situation. The abstention 
did not support military intervention per se, but did not hinder it either. India argued 
that not all peaceful measures were exhausted, thus R2P was unjustified. India later 
condemned NATO for supplying Libyan rebels with arms, which was not granted in 
the resolution, and the bombing of strategic targets, although they did not pose any 
threats to civilians. “This gave R2P a bad name”, said UN-ambassador Hardeep Puri 
at a seminar marking the tenth anniversary of R2P in 2012 (Banerjee, 2012). 
The Federative Republic of Brazil 
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Brazil has also kept a good relation with the international community and has ratified 
treaties that correlate to R2P, including the Genocide Convention, Geneva 
Conventions and the Rome Statute (Hamann, 2012: 73). Yet Brazil always 
emphasized state sovereignty and diplomacy to solve external conflicts, and did 
therefore reject the notion of R2P completely at first in 2001, since it was 
acknowledged as another “western tool for intervention” (ibid). Brazil argued that 
even when R2P is approved on the grounds of justice and legitimacy, human and 
material costs of a military intervention will be too severe; therefore exhausting 
diplomatic solutions is the key. Furthermore, R2P is considered at risk of being 
misused for other purposes than humanitarian, such as national interests and regime 
change. The Brazilian stance changed in the aftermath of the UN peacekeeping 
mission in Haiti in 2004, where Brazil played a crucial role and recognized the 
necessity to intervene once needed through humanitarian means if it ever sought more 
influence on global scale (Kenkel, 2012). Brazil is a regional soft power, stressing the 
importance of sub-regional arrangements, socio-economic and political integration, 
and lacking adequate military capacity to act as hard power. Much like India, Brazil 
emphasized the importance of prevention and capacity building found in pillars 1 and 
2 in R2P, during the 2005 UNGA summit. Although Brazil never rejected the third 
pillar, they argued that external intervention could only be seen as “an exceptional 
course of action” and that the pillars need a chronological sequence, indicating that 
Pillar II follows Pillar I, and Pillar III is only used as last resort (Permanent Mission 
of Brazil to the UN, 2011).  
Brazil also abstained in Resolution 1973 by arguing against the misuse of R2P, since 
most measures were not exhausted and the military means were disproportionate. 
Brazil was also concerned with the risk of spreading the conflict to the entire region, 
along with the constant pressure for regime change by P3 (Hamann, 2012: 79).  
The Republic of South Africa 
South Africa played a big role in shaping an earlier version of R2P, specific to the 
African Union (AU), which upheld the shift from indifference to non-indifference 
towards crimes of mass atrocities occurring in Africa (Landsberg, 2010). SA 
embraced the principle once proposed by ICISS in 2001, yet emphasized the need to 
focus on country-specific cases through diplomatic processes, rather than coercive 
methods. Much like Brazil and India, the first two pillars were embraced, and 
although the third was not opposed, SA still emphasized the need of political 
dialogues between the conflicting parts, rather than creating further disagreements 
(ibid). 
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Opposing to the other GIBSA “members”, SA voted for Resolution 1973 after Libya 
failed to approve any non-coercive measures. SA followed the guidelines of the AU, 
along with two other African non-permanent members of the UNSC, Gabon and 
Nigeria. The decision was based on increased support by LAS for military 
intervention and the threat to civilians, yet SA regretted its vote once NATO misused 
its mandate to impose a regime change, and criticized the implementation in the 
aftermath of the intervention (Aboagye, 2012). 
Purpose 
The principle of R2P has been discussed vividly in the last years, both academically 
and in the international community, predominantly due to the Arab civil uprisings, yet 
most of the arguments and researches review the stance of the P5. Consequently, the 
purpose of this paper is to add to the debate and forge new light onto the role of 
GIBSA in such discussions and the reasons behind their voting behavior on R2P 
proposals in Syria. This paper will help in filling the gap that exists in the academic 
field concerning the motives of emerging global powers and whether norms of 
institutional agreements influence them in our ever-increasing multipolar world.  
The paper aims at answering the following question: What motivates emerging global 
powers’, such as GIBSA, decisions once confronted with humanitarian crises? Do 
international principles, such as R2P, influence their voting behavior? 
The case of Syria was chosen since approximately 130000 people were killed in the 
on-going Crisis, which actualizes R2P as proposed by many in the international 
community. Since the P5 are assumed to pursue mainly national aspirations in Syria 
(Skansholm, 2013 & Garcia, 2013) and R2P was criticized severely in the aftermath 
of Libya, understanding the motives behind emerging global powers’ decisions in 
Syria will help in explaining whether R2P is still alive and taken into consideration, or 
if we can assume its death, as argued by multiple authors, such as Western & 
Goldstein (2013). GIBSA were chosen since they are emerging global powers, and 
current regional powers, and were part of the UNSC during 2011-2012 (Brazil in 
2010-2011), and formed an unofficial group to share common norms and values, 
hence their suitability for this paper. Also, four countries that cover all parts of the 
world, north, south, east and west, constitute GIBSA, hence this paper will not be 
another North-South or East-West discussion, which has been postulated in most R2P 
related articles. Other emerging powers could also be relevant, such as Australia, but 
were excluded since they were not in the UNSC during the Crisis. Since emerging 
global powers have the ability to influence the international community, mainly due 
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to their regional influence and other’s perception of them as important democratic 
actors and an alternative to the biasedness of the P5; R2P’s “life or death” may 
depend on whether it is accounted for or not by GIBSA in such humanitarian crisis. 
Literature Review 
This section will summarize few articles that may help in explaining the motives 
behind the decision outcome of the GIBSA countries in relation to the Syrian Crisis. 
Since this is an on-going conflict, there are no extensive researches specifically about 
it, instead some explain R2P after Libya and Syria from the perspectives of the P5 
(Skansholm, 2013 & Garcia, 2013), while others describe the GIBSA positioning on 
R2P prior to 2012 (Brosig, 2012). Therefore, this section will help in identifying the 
missing gap in the academic field, which will later be evaluated further empirically in 
the analysis section. 
Skansholm (2012) and Garcia (2013) have influenced this paper in their methods of 
analyzing the motives of actors; yet differ since they aimed at explaining the 
intentions behind R2P implementation in Libya and the lack of it in Syria through the 
perspectives of the P5. They both conclude that P5’s motives behind the Syrian and 
Libyan resolutions are based primarily on national aspirations and only secondarily on 
humanitarian reasons, which may also explain the motives of GIBSA in this paper. 
However, concerning the role of emerging powers on institutional agreements, 
Ramesh Thakur (2013) explains it by offering two possible outcomes: either they 
become joint and responsible stakeholders in the emerging new world order and take 
into account institutional frameworks and resolutions, such as R2P, through clear 
engagement in global issues, or they lose their ability to develop norms and 
institutions for global governance, if maintaining focus on national aspirations and 
protectionist policies. The latter will only lead these emerging global powers to 
limited powers, restricted to their regional aspirations, instead of global, and “with 
their material grasp longer than their normative reach”(ibid: 72). This may help in 
differentiating GIBSA from the P5, as they are in need of international recognition to 
boost their global aspirations, which in turn benefits their national aspirations to 
become UNSC permanent members. Higashi (2012) mentions that emerging global 
powers are more flexible and balanced in their decisions, because of their newly 
established identities as leading democracies in their respective regions. They are also 
keener to account for the discussions offered at the UNSC or even during informal 
meetings, to offer a voice of rationality, which profits their ambitions in the long run. 
Furthermore, Evans (2013) mentions that emerging powers play a crucial role in 
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affirming the balance and impartiality of R2P. Their views represent the general 
views of the world, and if a consensus is to ever be achieved, their consent is needed. 
Evans (2013) argues further that the Libyan case did damage the credibility of R2P 
since the P3 stressed regime change although it is not a part of the doctrine, which 
may have influenced GIBSA in Syria. Bellamy & Williams (2011: 847ff) also agree 
to Evans’ (2013) former statement and adds that the lack of consensus in regional 
organizations, such as LAS, could have been one distinct motive for the different 
outcomes between Libyan and Syrian resolutions. Gifkins (2012) recognized that 
India, Brazil and South Africa resisted R2P in Syria due to the overarching of NATO 
mandate in Libya, while Germany was in clear support of its allies. Gifkins noted 
further the importance of regional support in order to evoke R2P, and that emerging 
powers are likelier to vote for R2P implementation in Syria if that support was given 
by regional organizations. Regional groups act as “gatekeepers”, as they influence the 
issues that are debated in the UNSC and other assemblies, the framing of the 
resolutions and the outcome and legitimacy of the decisions (Bellamy & Williams, 
2011: 826). However, Gifkins only takes into account the first resolution concerned 
with Syria, therefore, to understand the overall motives, this paper will use all 
resolutions from 2011-2012 to strengthen the analysis. 
Furthermore, Bellamy & Williams (2011) discuss that states are keen to accept 
agreements against human rights violations but there is a difference between what the 
countries affirm to be right and what they actually do, hence the concept may be 
affected by “risk of relevance”. Risk of relevance indicates the willingness to accept 
norms against mass atrocities yet being unwilling or unable to find individual 
remedies to each case, which could be extrapolated to GIBSA since they are keener to 
use soft power than hard power, and therefore may hesitate if hard power intervention 
is proposed. However, Jon Western and Joshua Goldstein (2013) argue that R2P in 
Syria has failed since most countries focus on the perpetrators rather than on the 
victims, which is not in line with R2P. Instead, they argue that it is characterized by 
selectivity, and since the emerging powers may feel unaffected by the Syrian Crisis 
and the outcome of it, they may prefer to act accordingly. Aning & Okyere (2012) 
support that notion and add that the focus should always be on mass atrocities and 
how to hinder them rather than on regime change. If the principle of R2P is not 
applied evenly and impartially, R2P may be in risk to be misused as a tool for regime 
change against enemies of natural allies, which makes the entire concept loose 
relevance. Hence utilizing this reasoning, if GIBSA affirm that others are focusing on 
regime change, as proposed in Libya, they are assumed more likely to either abstain 
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from voting, or even vote against a resolution. At the same time, if an ally is for an 
intervention, they may vote accordingly.  
Consequently, we can extrapolate from previous researches concerned with R2P in 
Libya and/or Syria, which account for the motives of P5 and/or emerging global 
powers, that their decisions are influenced by either national aspirations, institutional 
frameworks, gatekeepers, historical application of R2P, allies’ decisions and/or the 
situation in hand. Combining these variables in relation to GIBSA will therefore fill 
the gap that exists in the academic field concerned with R2P in Syria, and help in 
describing the motives of emerging global powers and the role of international 
principles such as R2P in the decision-making process. If the latter is accounted for 
prior to GIBSA’s voting, then we can strengthen the notion that R2P is still alive and 
relevant, which is in contrast to previous assumptions by other scholars, such as 
Western & Goldstein (2013). 
Theoretical Framework 
The following section offers the tools that may help in understanding the motives 
behind the voting behavior of the GIBSA countries on Syria’s proposed resolutions, 
and whether R2P has influenced the outcome. This paper will use the three logics of 
human actions: logic of consequence, logic of appropriateness and logic of arguing, to 
help in describing the motives. Some researchers (Skansholm, 2013 & Garcia, 2013) 
have instead focused on three of the leading theories in international relations (IR): 
realism, liberalism and social constructivism. Realists stress the importance of 
competition and argue that states are rational and autonomous units that control 
international politics, since the latter is assumed anarchical; hence each decision made 
is based on self-interests (Keophane, 1986: 163). Social constructivism is 
characterized by social ontology, where cooperation and discussions are driven by 
rules and actors seek to fulfill their roles in a community or institutions (Ramirez, 
2009). Liberalism specifies that the state is a rational actor, influenced by internal 
bargaining among and within bureaucracies, institutions etc., and willing to cooperate 
to ensure mutual benefits with other actors (Maessen, 2012). Although these 
perspectives may be suitable in this paper to help understand the point of departure of 
GIBSA in voting processes, they tend to be too vague and less comprehensive in 
extensive analysis of a certain event, which in this case is the specific case of Syria’s 
proposed R2P resolutions. The three logics of human action are wide-ranging since 
they focus specifically on explaining the motives of the situation in hand, which may 
also be the case for the IR theories yet the latter tend to include other notions than the 
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motives, i.e. the worldviews of the actors etc. Hence the latter assumes a point of 
departure for all actions, while the logics assume that each action has its own motives, 
specific to that case. Furthermore, the IR theories do not necessarily cover the logic of 
arguing, which is an integral part of this paper since we assume that arguments and 
facts presented during resolution proposals may influence the outcome of an actor. 
Although the notion of logics of human action are used to understand the actions of 
human beings, the same framework could be used to explain the actions of states, 
since the latter is represented by human actors. 
This paper will take the point of departure of Risse’s (2000) article, Let’s Argue: 
Communicative Action in World Politics, which describes the logics of human action. 
However, Risse’s paper focuses primarily on logic of arguing, and how it makes the 
logics of human action theoretically more exhaustive. The framework will also be 
influenced by Checkel’s (2005) article in International Organization, which explains 
the mechanisms behind the socializations of norms included in the three logics: 
strategic calculation, role-playing and normative suasion. The article by James March 
and Johan Olsen (1998), which focuses on the definition of the logic of 
appropriateness and adds rule-guided behavior to the theory, will also be helpful. 
These mechanisms will help in linking the gap that exists between the theoretical 
components of this subject and the empirical analysis. Hence logic of consequence 
includes the mechanism of socialization of norms, as strategic calculation; logic of 
appropriateness is derived from role-playing and rule-guided behavior, while logic of 
arguing is expressed as normative suasion. Brommesson & Friberg-Fernros (2012) 
have also used the theories of Risse and Checkel to understand the three logics of 
human actions, in relation to states, but they aimed at developing a predictability 
mechanism that foresees decision-making outcomes in R2P proposals and whether the 
use of force may be more feasible if the principle’s norms were exhaustive, which 
differs from this paper that aims at explaining the motives of GIBSA and potential 
influence of R2P on them.  
Logic of Consequence 
Logic of consequence is constructed primarily on rational assumptions about pre-set 
interests and preferences. Thus, a state will always strive to maximize its utility, 
regardless of the situation or the discussions presented during resolution proposals. 
An actor will behave in accordance with its pre-set conditions; hence its behavior is 
guided by the outcome (Risse, 2000: 3). An actor performing under the logic of 
consequence strives to ensure that the rewards exceed the costs. Krasner (1999: 220) 
claims that due to the absence of any international authority, which can force 
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countries to apply to a given law, norms and values of international laws or principles 
are only second to national interests, hence a country will always ensure the 
maximization of its own utility rather than satisfying the norms of a given law or an 
institution. However, in order to reach a common stance in a decision-making 
process, other actors need to make their own strategic calculations that support their 
own ambitions while matching the latter’s, which is an important mechanism of 
socialization of norms (Checkel, 2005). Hence, one country may strive to convince 
the other part by arguing for a certain notion to fulfill the pillars of an international 
principle, yet in reality, it argues for its own ideals. Therefore, a country may appear 
as fulfilling the norms of a certain international law, yet in reality, their argument is 
usually characterized by rallying the listener behind ones own position. Hence, the 
country may gain both international recognition and support if it succeeds with its 
strategic arguing (Checkel, 2005). Krasner (1999) denotes this as Organized 
Hypocrisy, as countries only claim to support a given international law due to its 
framework, but in reality, if any support is given, it is because they may maximize 
their utility, either politically, if international recognition is given, or economically, if 
it relates to a trade agreement etc. Strategic calculations can be explained in different 
terms, as some countries may stress the importance of geopolitics, sovereignty or 
intervention, international ambitions etc. Furthermore, Risse (2000: 4) argues that 
“cooperation under anarchy” is possible and that rational and self-interested actors 
may maintain their independence and cooperate, while enduring collective action 
dilemmas. This specifies that self-interest may be correlated with socialization, as one 
country may strive for international recognition and only achieves it by ensuring that 
other countries benefit from their decision; hence Country A benefitted by the 
decision of Country B in solving Conflict X, which ensures the recognition of 
Country B by Country A, hence it is a win-win situation, although Country B acted 
for the sole purpose of receiving international recognition; thus maximizing its own 
utility.  
Logic of Appropriateness 
Logic of appropriateness signifies that an actor, or state in this case, makes a decision 
based on pre-set rules and norms, hence its behavior is rule-guided (March & Olsen, 
1998). These rules are based on what is socially and institutionally accepted; therefore 
the actor strives to do the “right” thing in accordance with pre-determined conditions. 
March & Olsen (1998: 3) best describe this logic in the following way:  
“A vision of actors following internalized prescriptions of what is 
socially defined as normal, true, right or good, without, or in spite of, 
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calculation of consequences and expected utility.” 
This logic can be contrasted to the logic of consequence, which assumes that the 
actors are self-interested and rationally calculating their decisions. Instead, given 
circumstances are neglected and the actor focuses on the norms of an institution or 
union that are pre-set and uninterested in the facts offered at the given negotiation. 
Therefore, an “automatic relation” (ibid: 7) between rules and action is required in 
order to safeguard the actor within the institutional framework. This means that the 
“right” thing is not necessarily the optimal solution, but it is what has been considered 
as the “right” thing in accordance with the norms and values of institutions and/or 
alliances. Brommesson & Friberg-Fernros (2013: 146) captures the former statement 
in this sentence: 
“The norms and institutions define the proper behavior but, as Risse 
points out, also “define social identities” in that “good people do X”. 
The norm constitutes an identity of a belonging to a group that is 
guided by certain rules. To be seen as a trustworthy member of this 
group, the actor tries to play according to the rules of the group.”  
Checkel (2005) offers another mechanisms to rule-guided behavior, namely role-
playing. Checkel argues that actors may not be aware of all facts; therefore they use 
“shortcuts, cues and buffers” (ibid: 810) that represent their role-playing. If an actor 
unquestionably fulfills his role, by voting in accordance with its allies and/or union, 
the norms and rules that are included in its respective role will shape the identity of 
the actor.  
Logic of Arguing 
There is an increased debate regarding the suitability of social constructivism and 
rational choice in the field of international relations (Risse, 2000), in which the logic 
of appropriateness and logic of consequence respectively are derived from; yet Risse 
(2000) argues that these two logics are not exhaustive since:  
“processes of argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion constitute 
a distinct mode of social interaction differentiated from both strategic 
bargaining… and rule-guided behavior.”(ibid: 1)  
This indicates that this logic helps in clarifying the interaction between the former two 
logics by ensuring that the actors change their preferences depending on the situation 
in hand or the discussions offered. Furthermore, Risse argue that:  
“Arguing is also relevant for problem solving in the sense of seeking 
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an optimal solution for a commonly perceived problem and for 
agreeing on a common normative framework” (ibid: 2),  
Signifying that arguing is crucial in negotiation to reach a common stance that 
maximizes the utility for both parties. Also, Risse claims:  
“Argumentative rationality appears to be crucially linked to the 
constitutive rather than the regulative role of norms and identities by 
providing actors with a mode of interaction that enables them to 
mutually challenge and explore the validity claims of those norms and 
identities. When actors engage in a truth-seeking discourse, they must 
be prepared to change their own views of the world, their interest, and 
sometimes even their identities.” (ibid: 2) 
This specifies that once a state has engaged in argumentations, it should be prepared 
to bend its ideals and pre-set conditions that exists in role-playing, and instead adapt 
to the discussions, unless the state’s own argumentation is strong enough to withstand 
or even to challenge, the other part’s opinions. Also, mentioning historical success or 
failures of a certain action in an argument may be crucial in convincing the other part 
whether the same action is to be considered again (ibid: 5ff).  
Concluding, logic of arguing specifies that rationality is not interest-based rather is 
adaptable to arguments and “search for truth” (Brommesson & Friberg-Fernros, 2013: 
148), and actors strive to persuade others with the force of better argument. “The 
truth” can best be reached if the norms of a principle are fulfilled; hence normative 
suasion is the central mechanism in this logic (Checkel, 2005, Friberg & 
Brommesson, 2013).  
Method 
A deductive qualitative approach will be used in this paper to specify whether R2P 
has influenced the decisions of GIBSA in the Syrian crisis. A deductive research is 
characterized by a top-down approach where the paper starts by drawing on existing 
theoretical concepts, in this case the three logics of human action (Charmaz, 2006). 
The paper proceeds on developing an analytical framework that helps in explaining 
the potential outcome; whether one or more of the logics characterize the motives 
behind the decision of each country. The data will be explained thoroughly and guide 
the way to an in-depth analysis, which is the foundation of qualitative empirical 
research (Wolcott, 1994: 28). Flyvberg (2011: 304) explains that a qualitative case 
study is best applied if the collection of data and interpretation of the findings are 
explained simultaneously; hence every argument and decision made by GIBSA’s 
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representatives during resolution discussions will be analyzed immediately once 
acknowledged as important data. Flyvberg (2011: 307) also states that a qualitative 
case study will give an in-depth understanding of an event and the environment in 
which it occurs. Therefore, explaining the situation in Syria and the discussions that 
followed it from the GIBSA countries, which are the multiple units of analysis, in the 
respective resolutions that cover the crises, may offer an adequate depiction of the 
events that surrounded proposed resolutions on Syria. The case study is also 
characterized by a nomothetic approach (Levy, 2008: 3ff), illustrated by a spatially 
bound event, in the form of the draft resolutions that followed the Crisis during 2011-
2012 at the UNSC. 
Motive Analysis 
To understand the reasons behind the voting behavior of GIBSA in resolutions 
concerned with the Syrian Crisis, motive analysis is conducted on the discussions and 
the actual votes. Motive analysis is postulated by Axel Hadenius in his article, The 
Verification of Motives (1983) and is utilized as a tool in explaining the motives of an 
actor. Hadenius argues that the motives can best be extracted by understanding the 
action primarily. Signifying that clear depiction of the arguments and votes presented 
by GIBSA’s respective UN ambassadors are needed to extract the real motives. These 
arguments and votes, known as indicators, which are the empirical data, will be 
matched with the three logics of human action, offering a satisfactory depiction of 
what might have caused the outcome of the voting procedures (Hadenius, 1983: 2ff). 
Hadenius mentions that a statement from a country’s foreign policy representative, in 
our case the respective UN Ambassadors for each country, defines the country’s 
attitude in principle towards a certain declaration or event, and could therefore be 
used as a framework to explain the motives (1983: 4f). A motive can best be justified 
if a country repeats specific motivations in different documents relating to the same 
topic; hence if Country A, in different resolution discussions, mentions its support 
towards its allies, then it most likely reflects its motives (ibid: 6). However, since not 
all motives are outspoken, as discussed in the theoretical framework and will be 
discussed further in the following section, some inferences need to be drawn to 
strengthen the arguments regarding the real motives (ibid: 4). Furthermore, statements 
from representatives can differ in proximity to different actions, since some may 
specify a certain action (such as the situation in Syria), while others postulate more 
general views or opinions, but not explicitly relating to that event (such as recognizing 
the necessity for world peace, sovereignty etc.). Hence, the latter requires inferences 
that lead to the depiction of the real motives. Consequently, the analytical framework 
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should be properly explained in order to match the indicators with the motives, but 
also to show the correlation between the inferences and GIBSA’s motivations (De 
Vaus, 2001).  
Operationalization of the Three Logics 
This paper will use an analytical framework to link the indicators to the motives, by 
categorizing them within the three logics of human action: logic of appropriateness, 
logic of consequence and logic of arguing. The method is similar to the mechanisms 
of the three logics by Brommesson & Friberg-Fernros (2012), but instead of 
predicting an outcome, it is used to understand the motives behind the outcome. The 
criteria for interpreting the findings are divided into two subsections for each logic; 
where one helps in explaining the motivations, while the other specifies the 
indications of the votes in relation to the resolutions, as shown in Table 1: 
 
Logic of Consequence 
Logic of 
Appropriateness 
Logic of Arguing 
Voting 
Behavior 
      
Motivations       
Table 1: Analytical Framework without characteristics 
It is important to understand that these logics do not have to compete, and instead may 
be used to complement each other; hence one nation may act in accordance to one 
logic in an event, while embracing another logic in others, or even combining them 
(Risse, 2000: 4). Therefore, Country A does not exclusively rely on Logic A; instead, 
Logic A may dominate the decision process of Country A, but still is influenced by 
Logic B and C etc.  
At first, this paper will offer the actual votes of GIBSA for each resolution. Secondly, 
each “member” will be analyzed separately, as we assume that they act individually 
and therefore do not always have common interests and votes. The GIBSA nations’ 
motives may change from one resolution to another, or a specific logic may dominate 
more or less in a resolution than the other, therefore a conclusion of each nation’s 
general positioning will be offered before proceeding to another. In the end of the 
analysis section, a conclusion to depict all nation’s possible motives will be offered 
and analyze whether there are some common grounds to their behaviors. The 
arguments of each nation in the respective resolution will be presented and matched in 
accordance with the following criteria: 
 Logic of Consequence: 
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The logic of consequence includes strategic calculations and maximization of utility; 
hence all actions are aimed to benefit the state primarily (Krasner, 1999). Therefore, 
any personal aspirations mentioned in the arguments are important indicators to 
highlight the motives. Since countries do not specifically pinpoint national interests as 
motives for their votes, clarifications of the characteristics in this logic are crucial. 
One feature may be if a country is indifferent to other’s arguments and facts in all 
resolutions, since we assume that the actor is guided by the outcome; i.e. if Country A 
stresses the importance of intervention in its arguments, with no regards to the facts or 
discussions presented, we may assume that the intervention is in its interests (Risse, 
2000: 3). This can also be achieved by arguing for a specific notion through the pillars 
of R2P, known as strategic arguing and organized hypocrisy (Krasner, 1999). Hence 
if Country A argues for the fulfillment of R2P while maintaining the same 
motivations, i.e. by relating to sovereignty, we may acknowledge a sense of strategic 
arguing as Country A may aim to preserve its pre-existing stance on the principle of 
sovereignty. Also, since GIBSA lack vetoing rights, their decisions are not as decisive 
as the P5, hence they may argue for the best outcome, although realistically, they are 
after international recognition. This may be understood as populist arguing since they 
present what is optimally assumed as the “right thing” by the international 
community, without any power to enforce it. 
Furthermore, since emerging powers are pursuing support by other states, the 
socialization with gatekeepers is crucial for future backing, since the latter has a great 
influence on the outcome. Gatekeepers, in our case, LAS, can help in legitimizing all 
actions; if the latter acknowledges the necessity to intervene in Syria, then R2P has a 
green light, and an intervention will be more conventional and less likely to hit back 
against GIBSA. Instead, the gatekeepers will be responsible for any potential failure 
of the intervention. Hence if Country A recognizes the call for gatekeepers to 
intervene and votes accordingly, although it maintains the same motivations as earlier, 
it may be understood as pursuing the recognition of that gatekeeper and minimizing 
their personal risks.  
Another important indicator is the voting itself and since this logic assumes that all 
actions are guided by the outcome, the voting behavior should not change, regardless 
of the motivations presented (Risse, 2000: 3). Therefore, if Country A requires 
intervention, then its vote will remain unchanged irrespective of the factual 
fluctuations. Furthermore, if Country A abstains from voting following the vetoing of 
some of the permanent members in fear of “bumping heads” with the latter, although 
they argue against/for any intervention, then we may assume that Country A seeks to 
Joe Lahoud 881221-1558 Master’s Thesis IAGG 2014 
  24 
maximize its utility.  
 Logic of Appropriateness: 
This logic of human action follows the characteristics of role-playing and therefore, a 
nation strives to fulfill its role in a given union or alliance, and will always support its 
allies and/or fellow members, regardless of the outcome, the discussions and the facts 
given (March & Olsen, 1998). Therefore, if Country A specifically mention any 
support to its allies and/or its regional organization in the proposed resolution, and/or 
argues from a “We-perspective”, such as the EU, NATO, AU or GIBSA etc., then its 
actions is compatible with role-playing. The same logic follows the voting-behavior; 
hence if Country A votes in accordance with its allies in all resolutions, then we can 
assume the same. If it exclusively argues and votes against its allies, then we can rule 
out that Country A is influenced by logic of appropriateness, and instead other logics 
may dominate its motive.  
 Logic of Arguing: 
This logic indicates the flexibility of countries to change behavior and motives if the 
arguments for an intervention or non-intervention are strong enough and the facts 
given are in, or not in, regulation to the pillars of R2P. Hence, if a country’s vote 
changes from one resolution to the other, it denotes a change in motivations and hence 
the country may be flexible to the facts and arguments presented (Risse, 2000). 
Another indicator to this logic is whether the country claims that the situation fulfills 
the conditions for intervention. Thus, did the country argue that the discussions and 
evidence presented are exhaustive vs. non-exhaustive? I.e. if Country A considers the 
Syrian government solely responsible for the events occurring and argues that most 
options have been considered and an intervention may improve the situation and/or 
mentions the UNSC’s responsibilities, then R2P is actualized and hence the evidence 
may be considered exhaustive; if not, then R2P is rejected. Furthermore, historical 
application of R2P may also influence the outcome of the decisions; hence did the 
country remark the failure/success in the Libyan intervention? If one or more of the 
former criteria are fulfilled, then the country may be categorized by norm-suasion, 
which exemplifies the logic of arguing. 
Concluding, as mentioned in the theoretical framework, one country will most likely 
not rely exclusively on one single factor; rather will take into account more than one, 
yet a single logic may dominate its motive. Hence, any “member” of the GIBSA may 
have voted in accordance with Logic A, although they probably have been influenced 
by other Logics, such as B to a certain extent and C to a lesser. I.e. Country A may 
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vote for Action A to fulfill the pillars of R2P, which is in accordance with the logic of 
arguing, yet the action may grant Country A recognition by other states, and hence its 
motivation includes both the notion of norm-suasion and pursuing national 
aspirations. Therefore, it is important to clarify every argument presented and match it 
with more than one category, in order to depict the real motives. The following 
analytical framework will be used in the analysis section to ease the categorization of 
the votes and motivations offered by the GIBSA countries: 
 
Logic of Consequence 
Logic of 
Appropriateness 
Logic of Arguing 
Voting 
Behavior 
•Unchanged Voting 
Behavior  
•Abstain from voting 
following vetoes  
•Voting in 
accordance with 
allies 
•Changed Voting 
Behavior due to 
factual fluctuation 
Motivations 
•Strategic 
Arguing/Organized 
Hypocrisy 
 •Indifference to facts 
and arguments 
 •Recognizing the call 
by Gatekeepers 
•Argues on the basis 
of identity affiliation 
•Mentions its 
support to its allies 
•Change in 
motivations 
•Accounts for R2P 
pillars  
•Mentions 
historical 
application of R2P 
Table 2: Analytical Framework with the characteristics 
Material 
This section discusses the resolutions used in this paper to understand the motives 
behind GIBSA’s voting behavior. The arguments during the selected resolutions are 
important indicators to extract the motives of the countries, since they offer arguments 
to their actions, in accordance with Hadenius et.al. motive analysis (1984: 149). 
Furthermore, the votes of the GIBSA countries are also important indicators and may 
also help in explaining the motives, since different outcome may be related to the 
questions raised within each resolution, or changes in motives. 
Since GIBSA are non-permanent members of the UNSC, their mandate ended in late 
2012 (Brazil by the end of 2011), yet the discussions continues in the UNGA until 
today regarding both the conflict of Syria and the principle of R2P. However, this 
paper will only take into account the discussions and votes prior to 2013, indicating 
the entire mandate period of GISA. Statements and votes at the UNGA regarding 
Syria will supplement the Brazilian motives in 2012. Keeping in mind that RC vetoed 
all resolutions regarding Syria at the UNSC; this paper will analyze UNSC draft 
resolutions (and GA resolutions from 2012). The arguments and votes were collected 
from first hand sources, such as the UN database and UNSC archival records.  
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The member states at the UNSC have proposed several resolutions dealing with the 
Syrian Crisis to end the violence and reach diplomatic solutions. The first of its kind 
was draft resolution SC/10403, sponsored by Germany, Portugal and the P3 in 
October 4
th
 2011. The draft aimed at “condemning grave and systematic human rights 
violations in Syria” along with warning “of options for action to be considered 
against the Government of President Bashar al-Assad if the unfolding situation 
warranted” and recognizing the government’s responsibility to protect its citizens 
(UNSC, 2011). The draft demanded immediate stop to the violence by both 
conflicting parties. It also called for a Syrian-led political process, with the inclusion 
of the Syrian opposition and the entire civil society, with freedom to express their 
opinions without fear from violence or extremism. RC vetoed the resolution, while 9 
members voted in favor and 4 abstained. 
The second draft proposed on February 4
th
 2012, SC/10536, by 20 countries, mostly 
Arabic, and included Germany and P3, emphasized the request by LAS to cease the 
violence by the Syrian government and resignation of Bashar el-Assad, and also the 
release of persons detained due to peaceful protests against the regime. The draft also 
stressed the necessity of a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic and 
pluralistic political system. It also required cease-fire by the armed groups against 
civilians and state institutions, and condemning all human rights violators. LAS 
required full access in Syria to monitor the crisis in firsthand. The draft also ruled out 
any military action under Article 42 of the Charter. The resolution failed once again, 
with 13 countries in favor and two against (RC) (UNSC, 2012a).  
Brazil was not a part of the UNSC in 2012, after concluding its two-years mandate in 
2010-2011. Instead, their opinion could be extracted from the UNGA resolution on 
February 16
th
 2012, GA/66/253A, which postulated similar questions proposed in 
SC/10536. This resolution condemned the systematic human rights violations by the 
Syrian authorities and demanded to cease all violence and protect the citizens. It also 
reaffirmed its commitment to the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic, and 
stressed the importance of diplomacy and peaceful solutions. This resolution was 
passed by a vote of 137 in favor, 12 against and 17 abstentions (UNGA, 2012a). A 
Six-Point Plan, negotiated by former UNSG, Kofi Annan, was accepted in March 
2012 by the UNSC and Syria since it excluded regime change. This six-point plan 
included a Syrian-led political process, ending violence and pulling back military 
from civilian areas, ensuring access for humanitarian workers and journalists, 
respecting the right to peacefully demonstrate and releasing those who are arbitrarily 
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detained (BBC, 2012). This plan is summarized since it influences the subsequent 
resolutions, but will not be analyzed further. 
The third failed UNSC resolution regarding Syria came in July 19 2012, SC/10714, 
sponsored by Germany, Portugal, and P3. Apart from the previous requests for an 
immediate cease fire and condemnation of the mass atrocities committed, this 
resolution also aimed at extending the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) 
for another 45 days, which was first implemented on April 21 2012, initially for a 90-
day period. The resolution also threatened the Syrian regime with sanctions if it failed 
to follow the Six-Point Plan proposed by Kofi Annan. Once again, RC vetoed the 
draft (UNSC, 2012b).  
On August 3
rd
 2012, a UNGA resolution, GA/66/253B, was proposed by Saudi-
Arabia, which condemned the use of heavy weapons on civilian areas and called for 
ceasefire, while denouncing the failure of the UNSC to implement any measures. This 
resolution was approved after 133 votes in favor, 12 against and 31 abstentions 
(UNGA, 2012b). 
Delimitations 
Since this paper deals with the approaches of the GIBSA countries, which is an 
informal grouping of emerging global powers and aspiring permanent UNSC 
members, there is a risk that their influence on the Syrian crisis and the principle of 
R2P itself is overshadowed by the actions (or inactions) of the P5 at the UNSC. The 
latter have vetoing rights and hence one veto is enough to suspend a resolution, 
indicating that GIBSA are more or less powerless in the UNSC. Therefore, since their 
votes are non-decisive, it may have influenced the outcome and/or their arguments. 
Moreover, there exist many forums for discussions regarding Syria and/or R2P, while 
this paper is limited to the discussions and votes during draft resolutions, which 
extrapolate important point of views and official stance of the GIBSA countries, yet 
are not necessarily exhaustive. Many important arguments, especially from GIBSA’s 
respective foreign departments, or unofficial statements by their respective UN 
ambassadors, may have strengthened the indicators to their motives, but due to time- 
and space constraints, they were avoided. Since the GIBSA countries are non-
permanent members of the UNSC, their mandate finished in 2012 (Brazil in 2011), 
denoting that the material provided is time-limited to 2011-2012, with supplementary 
materials from the UNGA in 2012. Many clarifications regarding GIBSA’s motives 
have been introduced in the aftermath of their UNSC membership. However, since 
this conflict is ongoing, events are likely to change; therefore it was crucial to 
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maintain the timeline 2011-2012 to ensure that the circumstances and materials 
correlate. Furthermore, since Brazil was not included in the UNSC in 2012, this paper 
could not relate solely on UNSC failed resolutions, which was the purpose from the 
start. Instead, we had to include GA resolutions to cover for it, but since not all 
countries offer motivations to their decisions at the GA, there is missing information 
to cover their true motives. Therefore, more emphasize is required on their existing 
speeches. 
Taking into account the complexity of the Syrian Crisis, and diverse coverage 
reaching both domestic and foreign audience, this paper will not investigate any 
specific incident of the crisis, rather focus completely on the reactions of the GIBSA 
countries in relation to the supposed incidents mentioned in a resolution, and their 
motives to vote accordingly. Furthermore, since this paper analyzes national 
aspirations, which is usually not forthright and in disguise, there is a risk of over-
analyzing or even misinterpreting a certain notion. Therefore, it is crucial to maintain 
consistency in explaining different outcomes, by affirming the categories included in 
the analytical framework, and offer alternatives to describe each motivation. 
Quality Assurance of Study 
Qualitative research has its critics like other methods if the research is conducted in a 
biased and sloppy way. Hence to ensure the reliability, validity and unbiasedeness of 
the empirical analysis, each answer will be discussed and alternative views will be 
considered throughout the paper (Héritier, 2008). Héritier argues further that 
deductive qualitative studies are often biased since the materials depict the 
perspective of the researcher’s subjectivity, but since this paper will use the scope of 
logics of human action to explain the positions of the GIBSA countries in relation to 
the Syrian Crisis, it allows the reader to understand the situation and the phenomena 
through different lenses, which increases the validity and reliability of the outcome. 
Also, since the analyzed data are official statements and votes made during the 
decision-making process of R2P in Syria, their quality and validity are credible since 
it reflects the country’s official stance, according to both Esaiasson’ et. al. (2012) and 
Hadenius’ (1983: 4f) motive analysis. To avoid generalizations regarding R2P’s many 
aspects, especially the role of the permanent members, problems of sovereignty vs. 
interventionist etc., the material collected relate completely to the topic and variables 
discussed. Once the variables are explained properly, extensive searches for official 
statements, that support or reject a certain notion, will be prioritized, and used as basis 
for the entire analysis. Furthermore, since we assume that the GIBSA countries are 
representing the emerging global powers, in accordance with Brosig (2012), the 
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analyzed data can be extrapolated to the bigger picture on whether R2P influences 
emerging countries. In addition, a nomothetic study helps in developing explanations 
of a certain event that could be generalizable to the bigger picture, if the case is 
strategically well chosen (George & Bennett, 2005 & Flyvberg, 2011); and since R2P 
is actualized in Syria and is considered one of the more complicated R2P cases, while 
sharing similar characteristics to Libya, it may be generalizable to the bigger 
application of R2P. Hence if norm-suasion influences the motives of GIBSA in 
resolutions concerned with Syria, we may assume that international principles affect 
emerging global powers, and R2P is alive.  
Analysis 
In the moment of writing, the UNSC has yet to reach a consensus on the measures 
required to stop the violence in Syria, mainly due to RC vetoes, while GIBSA dandle 
back and forth in their motivations regarding an intervention in Syria. As postulated in 
the table below, the GIBSA share in some resolutions the same positioning, while 
differ in others; especially Germany in comparison to IBSA, where the former has 
maintained its support to all resolutions, while the others have shifted in some. This 
section will analyze their motivations and votes to help in understanding their motives 
and whether international principles, such as R2P, influence their decisions. Each 
nation is analyzed individually along with their point of views for each resolution. 
Thereafter, a conclusion of the general motives will be offered before proceeding to 
another country. Once all are discussed in relation to each resolution, a general 
analysis will combine all motives of GIBSA and search for common grounds, or 
different aspects, to conclude this section.  
  
1st Draft 
Resolution 
SC/10403 
4/10/2011 
2nd Draft 
Resolution 
SC/10536 
4/2/2012 
General 
Assembly 
Resolution 
GA/66/253A 
16/2/2012 
3rd Draft 
Resolution 
SC/10714 
19/7/2012 
General 
Assembly 
GA/66/253B 
3/8/2012 
Germany For For  For  For For  
India Abstain For For For Abstain 
Brazil Abstain 
Not a 
member For 
Not a 
member For 
South 
Africa Abstain For For Abstain For 
Table 2: GIBSA votes in resolutions concerned with Syria 
The German Motives 
Resolution SC/10403  
Joe Lahoud 881221-1558 Master’s Thesis IAGG 2014 
  30 
Supported by its EU and NATO allies at the UNSC, Portugal and P3, Germany 
drafted Resolution SC/10403 on October 4
th
 2011, which condemned the violence and 
mass atrocities committed by the Syrian regime. Germany’s ambassador, Mr. Peter 
Wittig, argues: 
“The Syrian security force – military and militias – have violently and 
indiscriminately crushed demonstrations that were overwhelmingly 
peaceful”(UNSC, 2011: 10)  
and,  
“For months now the international community has called on the 
Syrian authorities to end all violence, fully respect human rights and 
comply with their obligations under international law”(ibid)  
This may indicate that since the regime has overused force against its population and 
the international community has called for an immediate stop to the violence, and 
since the conflict is still ongoing, all measures are considered exhausted and therefore, 
the international community has a responsibility to react. Furthermore, Germany 
mentions:  
“the European sponsors of this draft resolution have been working 
eagerly towards a compromise among Council members in recent 
weeks.”(ibid) 
and,  
“The people in Syria and the Arab world should know that Germany, 
its partners and all those who cherish the values of freedom … will 
not relent in their efforts to stand by them” (ibid) 
The last statements may affirm Germany’s support and unity with its allies and their 
role as freedom protectors, hence its latter motivation is characterized by role-playing. 
This notion is strengthened by their co-operation to draft the resolution and their 
similar votes.  
Resolution SC/10536  
Germany also helped in submitting draft Resolution SC/10536 with the support of 
many Arab states and P3. Mr. Wittig argued once again that an intervention is 
legitimate and the international community should react following the violence 
committed by the Syrian regime and since most peaceful measures have been 
exhausted: 
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“11 months of brutal violence and repression by the Syrian 
Government; after more than 5500 deaths; after the killing of almost 
400 children… today the Security Council again failed to assume its 
responsibilities”(UNSC, 2012a: 4)   
and,  
“The Syrian Government agreed to the cessation of violence, to the 
release of all political prisoners, to the withdrawal of its armed 
forces... According to the LAS, however, none of those commitments 
was fully met by the Syrian Government”(ibid)  
The UNSC responsibilities may refer to R2P and hence Germany argues for an 
intervention accordingly, which highlights norm-suasion. This is strengthened since 
the draft excluded regime change, which is not part of R2P, arguing:  
“the draft did not call for regime change, as some 
maintained”(UNSC, 2012a: 5) 
Germany also affirms the role of gatekeepers in this crisis:  
“The LAS urged the Council not to let the Syrian people down… That 
was the second major element of our draft resolution – to answer the 
call from Arab states and large parts of the international community 
to fully support the initiative of the LAS” (ibid)   
Germany voted for Resolution GA/66/253A in the UNGA, without motivating its 
decision, yet we assume that the motives reflected the former UNSC resolution, as it 
shared similar points. Once again, it voted similarly to its allies (UNGA, 2012a). 
Resolution SC/10714 
Germany submitted draft Resolution SC/10714, once again supported by P3 and 
Portugal. Mr. Wittig argued again:  
“Together with our partners, we worked to have the Security Council 
act to stop the violence and human rights abuses at a time when such 
action could have prevented worse from happening.” (UNSC, 2012b: 
5)  
This may clarify its role-playing in supporting its allies and human rights, but it could 
also strengthen the conception of norm-suasion since an intervention may have 
“prevented worse from happening”, which is an important attribute in R2P. 
Furthermore, Germany puts the sole responsibility of this crisis on the Assad regime: 
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“But with every day that the Al-Assad regime escalated its violent 
repression….it became more difficult for those Syrian voices that 
promoted peaceful change to convince those who had lost hope for a 
political solution…. Let me be clear: responsibility for that lies fully 
with President Al-Assad and his regime…. The Security Council has a 
responsibility to help the Syrian People find a peaceful solution”(ibid)  
also,  
“The draft resolution would not have set the stage for military 
intervention”(ibid) 
Germany argues that the UNSC has a responsibility to protect the citizens, probably 
referring to R2P, since all options for peaceful measures are considered deployed and 
hence an intervention, diplomatic and/or economic, should be conceived, without the 
possibility of military involvement, which may relate to the logic of arguing.  
Germany also chose to vote for resolution GA/66/253B with similar motivations as 
earlier (UNGA, 2012b). 
Concluding Germany’s Motives 
Germany always highlighted the violence committed by the Syrian regime, and the 
importance of respecting human rights and stopping all atrocities against citizens, 
indicating a motive to uphold the pillars of R2P, considered as norm-suasion. It also 
affirmed that the UNSC has a responsibility to protect the citizens several times, 
probably referring to R2P. It maintained its stance with its allies and drafted most 
proposed resolutions collectively and voted for them respectively, fulfilling the 
characteristics of role-playing. In addition, constant pressure on the Syrian 
government, although others blame the opposition for much of the violence, and the 
constant support for intervention strengthens the notion of role-playing as it shares 
similar arguments as the P3. Although Germany was in clear support of its allies 
throughout the Syrian Crisis, it suggested repeatedly that the resolutions should not 
set the stage for military intervention, and hence will probably abstain such measures 
if proposed, as in Libya, which strengthens the notion of norm-suasion. However, 
since Germany abstained from voting in Resolution 1973 for military intervention in 
Libya, the support and drafting of the failed resolutions on Syria may be explained as 
a way for Germany to re-align itself with its NATO and EU allies. Hence ensuring its 
role as protector of human rights and regaining respect by its allies will strategically 
benefit the country’s willingness to become an important player on the international 
scene, as long as the resolutions propose soft power interventions, which may explain 
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its unchanged motivations throughout the Crisis. Furthermore, it has supported the 
calls by local gatekeepers, such as LAS, to react to the situation and support a Syrian-
led political process, which may grant Germany recognition by LAS in future 
resolutions.  
Therefore, we might conclude that Germany is mainly influenced by role-playing, 
followed by norm-suasion and national aspirations respectively; although fulfilling 
R2P pillars, “ensuring human rights in Syria” and answering the calls of gatekeepers 
without the possibility of military intervention will most likely benefit its interests. If 
military intervention is proposed, Germany will most likely neglect its role-playing, 
as was done in Libya. 
The Indian Motives 
Resolution SC/10403  
India abstained from voting in Resolution SC/10403, which condemned the Syrian 
regime for its actions against its citizens. The Indian UN ambassador, Mr. Hardeep 
Singh Puri, motivated this decision by offering his concerns about the events in Syria:  
“with the deaths of hundreds of civilians and security force personnel. 
We deplore all violence, irrespective of who its perpetrators are” 
(UNSC, 2011: 6) 
moreover,  
“states also have the obligation to protect their citizens from armed 
groups and militants”(ibid)  
Hence India emphasizes that the authorities are not sole perpetrators in this crises, 
rather is responding to the militant forces and therefore are protecting their own 
population, which may affirm its willingness to uphold the principle of sovereignty. 
Furthermore, the ambassador mentions:  
“through the India-Brazil-South Africa initiative, we have urged them 
(Syrian authority, writer’s note) to exercise restraint, abjure violence 
and pay heed to the aspirations of their people”(ibid)  
which highlights the IBSA co-operation, and may explain their similar voting 
behavior in this resolution. Moreover, India assumes: 
“the international community should facilitate engagement of the 
Syrian Government and the opposition in a Syrian-led inclusive 
political process, and not complicate the situation by threats of 
sanctions, regime change as in Libya, et cetera”(ibid)  
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This may postulate R2P as non-eligible, since other measures are yet to be exhausted 
and regime change is considered as in Libya, hence historical application is 
considered; which might confirm norm-suasion in their decisions. 
Resolution SC/10536 
India voted for draft Resolution SC/10536 while condemning the violence committed 
by both sides of the conflict and stressing the IBSA initiative:  
“ensuring the stability and security of society. India has conveyed that 
message to the Syrian leadership, both bilaterally and with our 
partners Brazil and South Africa”(UNSC, 2012a: 8)  
which may explain their common voting behavior as in the first resolution. 
Additionally:  
“We note that the draft resolution enjoins the Government to protect 
its population, indicating that it should have the capacity to do so. The 
LAS is an important regional organization and should play its 
required and historic role in promoting political dialogue among the 
Syrian parties. In that context, we welcome the deployment of the 
League’s observer missions”(ibid)  
and,  
“Our support for today’s draft resolution is in accordance with our 
support for the efforts of the Arab League for a peaceful resolution of 
the crisis… We note that the draft resolution expressly rules out any 
measures under Article 42 of the Charter.”(ibid) 
Thus, India may have voted for this resolution mainly since it ruled out external 
intervention, especially military under Article 42 of the Charter, to ensure Syrian 
sovereignty. Furthermore, India acknowledges the role of gatekeepers in solving the 
crisis yet with limited tools, hence LAS should only act as a diplomatic bridge 
between the opposing sides in the conflict. Ensuring that LAS has a role to play in this 
conflict, while maintaining a peaceful approach, may ensure India support by these 
gatekeepers and others due to its neutrality. 
India voted also for Resolution GA/66/253A in the General Assembly, offering 
similar motivations as in draft Resolution SC/10536 (UNGA, 2012a: 13). 
Resolution SC/10714 
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India voted for Resolution SC/10714 and expressed its concerns for the violence 
occurring, especially the terrorist attack on high governmental officials in Damascus. 
Mr. Puri argued: 
“We voted in favour of the draft resolution today to facilitate united 
action by the Security Council in support of the efforts of the Joint 
Special Envoy”(UNSC, 2012b: 7)  
India recognized the necessity to solve this situation peacefully to allow the Syrian 
authorities and opposition to recommit to the six-point plan. India focuses further on 
the impartiality of UNSMIS to offer information about the real occurrences: 
“we have therefore supported action by the international community 
that addresses the Syrian crisis in a balanced and impartial 
manner”(ibid) 
hence the unbiased evidence presented by the UNSMIS may transform its decisions; 
therefore norm-suasion is supposedly significant in its decision-making. Furthermore,  
“We have called for the cessation of violence in all its forms and by 
all sides. We condemn all violence irrespective of who its perpetrators 
are”(ibid)  
India chooses its words carefully without demonization, which may be understood as 
strategic calculation to safeguard its impartiality and not risk “bumping-heads” with 
any part in this conflict. 
Resolution GA/66/253B 
India abstained from voting in Resolution GA/66/253B although it recognized the 
increased violence and calling on all parties to condemn it, arguing:  
“It was important that all parties fully abide by their obligations 
under Security Council resolutions. Unilateral actions of any kind 
would not help”(UNGA, 2012b: 9)  
India believes that all sides need to be held responsible and the demonization of one 
part will send the wrong signals, hence the abstention, and another example of 
impartiality and rationality, which may be understood as norm-suasion, since it fulfills 
R2P, but also strategic calculation, since filling the gap that exists between the P5 
may offer it support by unattached states. 
Concluding India’s Motives 
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In Resolution SC/10403, India argued that the focus on regime change as in Libya and 
sanctions without exhausting all measures, forced it to abstain to show its disapproval, 
since R2P was considered non-eligible. Furthermore, India’s initiative, along with 
IBSA, to solve the crisis diplomatically, and the willingness to exhaust all tools before 
approving any intervention, highlights the role of norm-suasion in decisions. Since 
India mentioned the IBSA initiative twice, we can sense some role-playing, yet far 
from distinctive overall. Yet India still did not vote against the first resolution, 
probably indicating a fear of challenging the P3. In addition, India emphasized Syrian 
sovereignty several times and its responsibility to solve internal conflicts, which 
clarifies its own perspective regarding sovereignty and the importance of maintaining 
it. India changed its vote in the following resolutions, since they ruled out military 
intervention and regime change, and instead focused on the role of gatekeepers. It 
considered LAS as an impartial part that would offer a diplomatic bridge between the 
conflicting sides and solve the crisis peacefully, probably to ensure their support in 
the future, which will benefit its aspirations of becoming UNSC permanent member 
eventually. In Resolution GA/66/253B, India abstained from voting as a protest 
against the demonization of the Syrian regime, and stressed the importance of 
maintaining impartiality in solving the crisis. This could be seen as part of norm-
suasion, since R2P pillars are not fulfilled and its voting behavior is constantly 
changing, but also as a strategic calculation to primarily, gain international 
recognition by LAS and the public by populist arguments and voting, and secondarily, 
to avoid clashes with either sides of the P5. Although its voting behavior differed, 
India still argued mainly from a sovereign perspective. Hence India’s motives can be 
categorized in all logics, but mainly in logic of consequence, followed by norm 
suasion and lastly by role-playing. 
The Brazilian Motives 
Resolution SC/10403  
The Brazilian UN ambassador, Ms. Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, abstained from voting 
in draft Resolution SC/10403. Brazil reaffirmed its role-playing and common voice in 
the IBSA initiative by adding: 
“Brazil has voiced this concern publicly and in our conversations 
with the Syrian authorities, …alongside our India-Brazil-South Africa 
partners. We have called for violence to cease and humanitarian 
access to be granted”(UNSC, 2011: 11)  
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This may also indicate that most tools are yet to be used and therefore R2P is non-
mandated, hence the abstention. Brazil mentioned the initiative announced by Syria to 
reform the political system and ensure ceasefire while adding:  
“We appreciate the efforts made by the sponsors of this draft 
resolution to take different views into account, but we would have 
wished that further efforts had been made to muster broader support 
before it was put to the vote”(ibid)  
and,  
“We are convinced that more time would have allowed for differences 
to be bridged and for legitimate concerns to be accommodated, to 
prevent another accelerated intervention” (UNSC, 2011: 12) 
This may postulate that the logic of arguing plays a bigger role in Brazil’s voting 
procedure, since it takes into account arguments in bridging the differences between 
nations’ diverse positioning, but also, since “another accelerated intervention” most 
likely conveys to the failed Libyan intervention. 
Resolution GA/66/253A  
Since Brazil was no longer a member of the UNSC in 2012, their positioning 
regarding R2P in Syria can be extrapolated from Resolution GA/66/253A, which 
covered merely the same points as postulated in resolution SC/10536. Brazil voted for 
this resolution (UNGA, 2012a) yet did not offer any motivations to their decision; 
instead, in resolution GA/66/253B, Brazil argues: 
“The position we took today is coherent with Brazil’s policy with 
regard to the Syrian crisis since its beginning”(UNGA, 2012b: 15)  
By looking at the subsequent part, their decision were assumed based on LAS’ 
willingness to intervene through peaceful measures, whilst affirming the Syrian 
authorities’ responsibility to solve its own problems and by condemning the violence 
committed by both sides. Hence its coherent position may indicate a reluctance to 
change motivation, and instead focus on assuring Syria’s sovereignty, human rights, 
while condemning both parties in the conflict. 
Resolution GA/66/253B 
Brazil’s UN-ambassador voted in favor of this resolution arguing:  
“we fully support the main message it conveys – the urgent need for a 
ceasefire, the cessation of violence in all its forms, and the full 
implementation of Security Council resolutions” (implementing six-
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point plan and UNSMIS supervision, author’s note) (UNGA, 2012b: 
15) 
and,  
“message all parties to renounce the use of force, since there is no 
military solution to the conflict.”(ibid) 
This could affirm Brazil’s characteristic as a soft, impartial and rational power, which 
may be acknowledged by the international community, and specifically by the public. 
This response may benefit Brazil in the long run as an alternative voice to the P5, 
which suits its national aspirations. Yet Brazil recognized that the main responsibility 
to uphold the rule of law is by the state: 
“The primary responsibility for ending violence, upholding the aw – 
both domestic and international – and respecting human rights lies 
with the government of Syria… At the same time, we also insist that 
all parties fulfill their obligations to halt the violence….In that regard, 
international stakeholders must refrain from any action that might 
deepen or prolong the conflict… No legitimate purpose will be truly 
served by the further militarization of the conflict and increased 
destabilization of Syria”(ibid) 
Hence, the international community can only ease the process by offering support for 
diplomatic efforts and to refrain from increased hostility or militarization of either 
sides of the conflict. Brazil stood therefore firm to the principle of sovereignty and 
peaceful measures and since Syria has the sole responsibility of upholding national 
and international law, no other party should intervene. Thus arguing for its own 
interests in upholding national sovereignty. 
Concluding Brazil’s Motives 
In motivating its abstention in the first resolution, Brazil mentioned the willingness by 
the Syrian authorities to impose political reformations, and the IBSA-initiative for a 
diplomatic solution, hence all measures were not exhausted and therefore R2P was 
considered illegitimate. Furthermore, Brazil also mentioned that more time is needed 
to bridge the differences between UNSC members and avoid another military 
intervention as in Libya, pinpointing the necessity of argumentation and historical 
application in decision-making, which are also characteristics of norm-suasion.  
Brazil always emphasized the importance of supporting popular uprisings, and the 
condemnation of violence against them yet it also condemned the opposition for the 
violence and gave the government the sole responsibility to protect its citizens, 
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affirming its behavior as a soft power and sovereignty upholder. Brazil stood 
therefore firm to its principle of sovereignty, which influence its stance in the long 
run. Regarding proposed intervention, Brazil argued that the international community 
could only offer diplomatic means, through LAS, hence ensuring a peaceful solution 
to the crisis. Therefore, the recognition of gatekeepers as important players would 
benefit Brazil’s national aspirations in the long run if a UNSC permanent membership 
was proposed. Hence Brazil changed its voting behavior from the first resolution yet 
still maintained the same motivations, by acknowledging the necessity to ensure 
Syria’s sovereignty primarily, which are characteristics of the logic consequence. 
Also, Brazil mentioned the IBSA initiative yet its role-playing is not distinctive. 
Therefore, Brazil can be characterized mainly by the logics of consequence, followed 
by logic of arguing and barely by logic of appropriateness. 
The South African Motives 
Resolution SC/10403  
The South African UN ambassador, Mr. Baso Sangqu, confirmed their concern 
regarding the political and humanitarian situation in Syria and called for immediate 
end of all violence by all parts of the conflict, yet chose to abstain from voting in draft 
Resolution SC/10403. Mr. Sangqu argued: 
“This solution must also preserve the unity, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Syria. Syria is integral to a wider resolution of 
the Middle East conflict…Any action on the part of the international 
community on Syria, therefore, including action by the Security 
Council, should be cognizant of the regional implications. We have 
seen recently that Security Council resolutions have been abused, and 
that their implementation has gone far beyond the mandate of what 
was intended”(UNSC, 2011: 11)  
and, 
“We are concerned that this draft resolution not be part of a hidden 
agenda aimed at once again instituting regime change, which has 
been an objective clearly stated by some.”(ibid)  
This may be understood that historical application of R2P, e.g. in Libya, has raised 
suspicion towards the motives of the P3 and their allies, and regime change has once 
again been an integral part of the proposed resolution, which is not in line with R2P 
pillars, hence SA may have acted on behalf of norm-suasion. Furthermore, SA 
describes the threat to regional stability if Syria is demonized, since any intervention 
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may increase the loss of human lives instead of limiting it. SA also focuses on 
assuring Syria’s sovereignty, which may be in its own interest. The motivations 
presented should probably be enough to reject this resolution, yet the abstention could 
be strategically chosen to safeguard its impartiality and unwillingness to challenge the 
P3. 
Resolution SC/10536 
SA voted for draft Resolution SC/10536 since the Syrian government failed in 
enforcing the reforms that it claimed willing to do. SA also declared: 
“We are also satisfied that the final draft resolution was not aimed at 
imposing regime change on Syria, which would be against the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter”(UNSC, 
2012a: 11) 
This may explain the importance in fulfilling the pillars of international principles 
since it acknowledges the exclusion of regime change, which is not included in any, 
and specifically not in R2P, which is an important characteristic of logic of arguing. 
SA still condemns both sides of the conflict, the government and the opposition, to 
refrain from using force and end the violence. Furthermore: 
“South Africa believes that the efforts of the League of Arab States, as 
the organization with knowledge of a proximity to the situation in 
Syria, should be supported and given the necessary political space to 
find a solution to the Syrian crisis. SA supports the efforts of the LAS 
to facilitate the Syrian-led political process, as stated in the draft 
resolution.”(ibid) 
This affirms the role of gatekeepers in solving the Crisis through peaceful means, 
which may benefit SA’s aspirations in the long run. However, respecting Syria’s 
sovereignty is once again proposed as integral: 
“Any solution must preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Syria.”(ibid) 
SA also voted for Resolution GA/66/253A in the UNGA, without presenting its 
motivations (UNGA, 2012a). 
Resolution SC/10714  
SA condemned the violence once again by all sides and called for an immediate 
ceasefire and implementation of the six-point plan presented by Kofi Annan and move 
towards a Syrian-led political transition:  
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“The suicide bombing in Damascus yesterday, which killed the Syrian 
Defense Minister and others, coupled with frequent horrific massacres 
in various parts of the country, clearly indicates that there’s more 
than one party to the conflict...”(UNSC, 2012b: 11)  
Therefore, SA abstained from voting to mark its disappointment towards the division 
in the UNSC, claiming: 
“South Africa is disappointed that, because of the divisions among the 
members of the Council, the Council has been prevented from 
executing its responsibilities. Differences within the Council should be 
addressed in a spirit of compromise and mutual respect, and with the 
Council’s broader responsibility in mind… We should have shown the 
utmost maturity in strategically executing these crucial tasks, taking 
into account the realities of the situation on the ground. Instead, we 
allowed narrow interests to destroy our unity of purpose…South 
Africa is therefore deeply disappointed that the future of UNSMIS is 
under threat because of the divisions in the Council. It is for these 
reasons that South Africa abstained in the voting”(ibid)  
Hence, SA took the opportunity to raise a concerned voice and populist speech, while 
affirming itself to be free from pursuing national interests, although this speech most 
likely will benefit the outlook by the public and international community. Yet it 
mentioned the importance of bridging the differences through compromises and “the 
broader responsibility in mind”; probably referring to R2P; while taking into 
consideration the facts on the ground, which are all characteristics of the logic of 
arguing. 
Resolution GA/66/253B 
Although SA abstained in voting in the former UNSC resolution, they voted for 
Resolution GA/66/253B, arguing:  
“Despite our misgivings about some aspects of the text…we believe 
that it is necessary for the United Nations to speak with one voice in 
taking action.”(UNGA, 2012b: 8)  
SA argued that the resolution was imbalanced and should not favor any side, but since 
it is non-binding, and the urgent need to resolve the crises, SA supported it. Hence 
safeguarding once again its impartial position, while taking into account the situation 
on the ground, which may be characterized by both norm-suasion and national 
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interests. SA affirmed again that Syria has the main responsibility to solve the 
situation. 
Concluding South Africa’s Motives 
SA abstained from voting in the first resolution due to historical application of R2P, 
arguing for a misuse of the principle and fearing that history will repeat itself in Syria, 
since other countries were focusing on regime change and military intervention, 
which is a characteristic of norm-suasion. Yet SA did not vote against the resolution 
since they felt the need to condemn mass atrocities committed by both parties in the 
conflict and probably to avoid challenging P3’s decisions. In the second UNSC 
resolution, SA mentioned the lack of unity among regional organizations, yet voted 
for a diplomatic intervention, since LAS proposed a discussion and monitoring forum 
for both conflicting parties, probably to ensure their support. Also, since the Syrian 
government refused to impose the reforms that they agreed upon earlier, SA felt that 
most options of non-intervention were exhausted, and hence a reaction by the 
international community was needed, affirming once again norm suasion. In the third 
UNSC resolution, although they still condemned the violence committed, SA took a 
stance and abstained from voting, arguing its disappointment at the international 
community to base their votes on their national interests and picking parties in the 
conflict, instead of solving it. SA offered a populist speech against the unbalanced 
resolution and the importance of maintaining a strict guideline against all parties who 
use violence for political gains. The international community and the public 
applauded this stance, as SA maintained its impartiality and gave a sound of reason to 
the UNSC, which had been in deadlock since the crises began in early 2011; probably 
benefitting its national aspirations. In Resolution GA/66/253B, they voted for the 
resolution although they still recognized it to be imbalanced, yet felt the urge to 
condemn the violence and the UNSC lockdown. This shifting in position indicates 
that SA is willing to take into account different arguments and facts, hence its motives 
are mainly categorized with logic of arguing. Yet its abstention, although its 
motivations should lead to a rejection of the proposals, may indicate that SA avoids 
clashes with the P3 and its allies, hence it is also influenced by the logic of 
consequence. This is strengthened by the constant motivations to ensure Syria their 
sovereignty, which lies in SA’s main interests. No signs of role-playing occurred, or 
mentioning of the IBSA-initiative, except from the similar votes in the first and 
second resolution. 
Analyzing the GIBSA Motives 
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Given the arguments discussed earlier in this section, GIBSA’s motivations and 
motives may correlate in some resolutions, while differ completely in others, 
especially between Germany and IBSA. These divergent perspectives offer a healthy 
discussion to R2P in Syria, instead of the self-centered perceptions of the permanent 
members in the UNSC, as RC veto everything related to Syria, while P3 push for all 
measures against the government. The positioning of GIBSA cannot be characterized 
under a united banner; rather each nation in this unofficial union argues for its own 
perspectives. However, the IBSA are more likely to react identically compared to 
Germany, since the former share many similar characteristics in relation to their 
history, and their connection with the RC in the BRICS-grouping, while the latter tend 
to lean towards its NATO and EU allies more often.  
In the first proposal, Resolution SC/10403, co-authored by Germany, the IBSA, and 
especially South Africa, were in opposition due to historical application of R2P in 
Libya, blaming the west for an illegitimate military intervention and regime change, 
for overarching their mandate and therefore, undermining the principle of R2P. They 
feared that history would repeat itself, as P3 blamed the government for all violence, 
with no condemnation of oppositional atrocities, although there exist evidence of 
terrorist activities. IBSA also feared that intervention would lead to further escalation 
of the conflict and that not all diplomatic measures were exhausted; hence their 
motives were characterized by norm suasion. Yet the abstentions, rather than voting 
against the resolution, can be understood as a way to avoid confrontation with the 
West, indicating a strategic calculation to their decisions, since voting against P3 may 
risk their international recognition severely. On the other hand, Germany supported its 
allies and mentioned their eagerness to protect the freedom of the citizens and 
therefore maintained its role-playing as EU and NATO member, but also as freedom 
protector. While Germany opposed the Libyan intervention, mainly due to the 
military involvement, they did not relate to the historical application of R2P, since 
this resolution focused solely on condemnation and threatening with diplomatic and 
economic sanctions. Germany also focused on the atrocities committed by the Syrian 
authorities and hence argued that the latter promised reforms yet failed to impose 
them, hence norm-suasion did also play a role in its decision making. 
Taking into account that IBSA were criticized severely in their positioning in unity 
with RC, known as the BRICS, following the first draft resolution, the voting 
behavior afterwards may have changed to avoid a “bad reputation” and additional loss 
to their international recognition. The IBSA kept pushing for condemning both sides 
of the party, to avoid clashes with the divided UNSC, and preserving Syrian 
Joe Lahoud 881221-1558 Master’s Thesis IAGG 2014 
  44 
sovereignty, which can be understood through the logic of consequence, to safeguard 
their reputation as unattached to either sides. This may benefit how they are perceived 
by the public and unattached states, but also, it may preserve the principle of national 
sovereignty, which is in their interests. 
The second UNSC resolution, SC/10536 (not including Brazil), and the GA 
resolution, GA/66/253A, showed a united front by the GIBSA countries as both 
resolutions focused less on the perpetrator and instead condemned the violence by 
both sides of the conflict, which was increasingly worsened, and the monitoring of 
LAS for a Syrian-led political process, and most importantly, ruled out any military 
intervention. This affirms GIBSA as considering gatekeepers crucial in the 
representation of public demand, and also, the fear of a military intervention. IBSA 
kept pushing for state sovereignty, while Germany kept its alliance and sole blaming 
of the Syrian regime, following the same patterns as its NATO and EU allies.  
The third UNSC resolution, SC/10714, threatened sanctions against the Syrian 
authorities, and put the sole responsibility on the Syrian government. This was voted 
for by India and Germany, yet abstained by SA (Brazil was not included). Germany 
maintained its hard condemnation of the Syrian regime and support to human rights, 
while India voted for the resolution as it contained the monitoring of the UNSMIS, 
which was considered impartial, and recognized the necessity to respect Syria’s 
sovereignty. South Africa took a stance arguing for the unbalanced resolution where 
the Syrian regime was demonized if the sanctions were imposed. SA gave a much-
needed rational voice to the UNSC, where it had been on deadlock since the start of 
the Crisis.  
Resolution GA/66/253B condemned the atrocities committed and the use of heavy 
weapons, while condemning the lack of action by the UNSC, where Germany, Brazil 
and SA voted for while India abstained. Germany followed the same lead as earlier, to 
condemn the Syrian authority and also RC for vetoing all proposed resolutions, as was 
done by its NATO and EU allies. Brazil argued for their consistency in supporting 
public uprisings and in the condemnation of both sides, yet emphasized the necessity 
of a peaceful approach through impartial gatekeepers, while respecting the territorial 
sovereignty of Syria, which confirms Brazil’s strategic arguing for national 
sovereignty. SA argued for the necessity of one common voice by the international 
community, although the resolution favored one part over the other, to also safeguard 
its neutrality. India argued that the resolution was unbalanced and endorsed regime 
change, which is not in line with R2P and only demonizes one side of the conflict, 
hence it abstained from voting, strengthening its position as an impartial actor, 
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without risking to collide with the P3. Hence affirming the role of emerging global 
powers as an alternative to the “black and white” atmosphere dominating the UNSC. 
As postulated in the resolutions discussed, the decisions of the GIBSA countries may 
take into account all three mentioned logics of human action, as many factors may 
influence the decision outcome. For example, Germany’s motives are clearly 
dominated by its role-playing and rule-guided behavior, as it supports, votes and co-
authors all drafts with its allies and mentions their eagerness to combat mass atrocities 
and impose human rights collectively. Yet Germany also argues for the fulfillment of 
R2P pillars, as they focus thoroughly on the violence committed by the Syrian 
government and the latter’s unwillingness to reform or stop such atrocities, which is 
in accordance with norm suasion. Also, since they take into account legal intervention 
and supports human rights and its allies, this will benefit Germany’s national 
ambitions to play a bigger role on the international scene. Therefore, a decision is 
mainly based on all three logics of human actions, yet no country will make a decision 
unless it benefits them more than does harm, through economical, diplomatic, or 
strategic means. This is clearer in the IBSA case, as they usually tend to offer more 
populist and strategic arguments to safeguard their interests, while are eager to listen 
to the arguments and facts given during or prior to resolution discussions, to analyze 
whether the situation fulfills the pillars of R2P, probably not only for the sake of 
norm-suasion, but possibly also to gain the recognition needed by the international 
community and avoid possible clashes with both parties in the conflict and at the 
UNSC. The importance and constant arguments for Syria’s sovereignty may affirm 
IBSA’s resistance of the third R2P pillar, which gives the international community the 
right to intervene in a sovereign state, especially in the aftermath of the Libyan 
intervention. Furthermore, GIBSA’s flexible stance, although Germany maintained its 
position in the resolutions concerned with Syria, may also be explained by their lack 
of interest in the regime itself, and therefore have less at stake if it fell or not, and 
therefore may chose the motivations and votes that benefits them mostly. Hence the 
principle may suffer from selectivity, as postulated by Western and Goldstein (2013). 
In addition to their lack of interest in Syria, their votes are not as decisive as the ones 
with vetoing rights, which will increase the possibility of arguing and voting in 
accordance with the swinging pendulum of the international community, to ensure the 
maximization of recognition and support.  
Concluding, GIBSA’s decisions are assumed to focus primarily on how they are 
perceived by the international community, which correlates with their ambitions to 
become permanent members in the UNSC and important actors on global scale. 
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Therefore, they are anticipated to take into consideration international principles in 
their decision-making processes, such as R2P, or else, unattached states or the public 
may not grant them that. Also, IBSA’s resistance towards the third pillar is much 
alive, especially in the aftermath of Libya, hence most of their arguments relate to 
sovereignty, known as strategic arguing or Organized Hypocrisy. Hence national 
ambitions may be the main motives for a decision, followed by norm suasion and 
role-playing. This characterizes mainly the overall approach by emerging global 
powers, but since Germany leans more towards its regional allies, its role-playing is 
highlighted more. However, logic of appropriateness may be less emphasized by 
Germany if military intervention is proposed, as was done in Libya.  
Conclusion & Reflections 
This paper has analyzed the motives of GIBSA countries in UN resolutions concerned 
with the Syrian crisis during the years 2011 and 2012, and whether R2P has 
influenced their decisions. Taking into account the three logics of human action; with 
logic of consequences characterized by pursuing national aspirations, logic of 
appropriateness depicted by role-playing, and lastly by logic of arguing, which 
denotes norm-suasion; GIBSA’s motives can best be explained if all three logics are 
imposed, although some motives may dominate more than others. In all resolutions, 
GIBSA consider mainly the arguments and facts presented prior to a voting 
procedure, and thus argue for the “right” thing, hence their motivations appear to be 
characterized mainly by norm suasion. Yet, however we ideally place the emerging 
global powers as supporters of human rights and international principles; the “right” 
thing may only be argued for to ensure the maximization of utility received. This may 
be clarified by IBSA’s skepticism towards the third pillar of R2P in most motivations, 
and their willingness to uphold the principle of sovereignty, hence affirming 
Checkel’s (2005) and Krasner’s (1999) theories of strategic arguing and Organized 
Hypocrisy respectively. Furthermore, role-playing seems to have a minor influence on 
IBSA, since they are not as attached to an alliance as Germany is with the EU and 
NATO. Germany is affected more by the decisions of its alliances and hence has 
formed an identity thereafter, yet it may still go against its allies if military 
intervention is proposed, as was done in Libya. 
Therefore, the reality is that R2P intervention in other sovereign states will persist as a 
matter of choice of. Hence, R2P is characterized mainly by selectivity, as discussed 
by Goldstein & Western (2013). Before deciding whether to intervene or not, clear 
strategic, economic and political calculations are needed to calculate whether it is 
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worth it or not; and whether there is a likelihood of solving the crises if R2P is 
implemented. The selective behavior is considered the death of R2P, yet looking at 
the discussions that occur in the international community and taking into 
consideration that R2P is still a young principle, R2P is already rooted in the 
expectations of the behavior of democratic states when facing extreme humanitarian 
crises in other sovereign states. Therefore, R2P is alive. 
As a potential remedy, the international community, with the help of emerging global 
powers, need to focus on the first pillar of R2P primarily; to prevent atrocities from 
occurring; and in the case of the inevitable, clear structures and mechanisms of 
intervention need to be set regardless of strategic calculations. Furthermore, as 
mandated in the “Responsibility to Rebuild” in R2P, post-conflict reconstruction and 
mediation is crucial to make sure that atrocities do not re-occur. With regards to 
GIBSA’s traditional regional focus and foreign policy, it is clearly shifting to 
accommodate their willingness to become global actors, but mainly through a softer 
approach than the P5. Therefore, emerging global powers should push for the 
restraining of vetoing rights at the UNSC, as it is an old fashioned system that does 
not deserve the multipolarism that characterizes today’s international system. A softer 
approach to mass atrocities may ensure the de-escalation of a conflict, by 
guaranteeing a political dialogue between all parts, instead of the opposite that usually 
occurs once a regime is demonized. 
This paper has thus modified the general claim that R2P is dead and hence argued for 
its relevance in the decision-making process of emerging global powers such as 
GIBSA, opposing to Western & Goldstein’s assumption (2013). However, its 
relevance is not exclusively aimed at ensuring human rights and protecting citizens, 
instead, it may be used as a pretext to ensure the support and recognition by other 
states and to safeguard a nation’s own interests, by voting in accordance with 
gatekeepers and offering a rational and impartial approach to a situation. Therefore, 
human rights and protecting citizens from mass atrocities goes hand in hand with their 
eagerness to ensure national aspirations, which is understandable since no actor wish 
to take any unnecessary risks. Consequently, since we presume that R2P is relevant in 
the decision-making process, we may assume that international principles in general 
are respected by emerging global powers, as long as it suits their ambitions. This is 
the case since no international authority can enforce these principles, hence most 
international norms and values will remain a matter of selectivity. This paper can 
hopefully motivate further research of the principle of R2P, and the discovery of clear 
guidelines for its implementation, to ensure that selectivity is minimized in future R2P 
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proposals. Also, since emerging global powers prefer soft power approaches to 
conflicts, our hope is to shed light on the international system’s hegemony and instead 
offer a healthy alternative to the deadlock that usually occurs between the UNSC 
permanent members.  
In addition to the empirical results relating to the influence of R2P on GIBSA; this 
study has yielded a methodological contribution that could explain the simpler 
motives of countries. Unfortunately, due to time and space constraints, I could not 
measure the exact correlation between international principles and the motives of 
GIBSA. Nor could I precise the most valued national interest and clarify the exact 
difference between arguing for R2P and arguing for international recognition. Since 
barely any of national interests are outspoken and much of the assumed aspirations 
are built on speculations and overanalyzing of the motives, there is always a risk of 
misinterpretation. However, this paper will hopefully raise the awareness concerned 
with the correlation between national interests and international norms and principles, 
and how they influence emerging powers and others. Although national interests may 
dominate the motives of GIBSA, this should not indicate that we should ignore the 
norms and principles that the actors base their arguments on; instead, we could 
develop this methodological approach to increase our understanding of that relation. I 
hope that future researcher can build on this study of the relationship between the 
three logics of human action through enhanced empirical data collection and further 
developing of the theoretical framework to ensure further mapping of the motives and 
offer a broader understanding of the relationship between an actor’s motivations, 
motives and actions. 
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